


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(Stackpole Military History Series)

The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-39 (Stackpole Military History Series)

Robert A. Doughty

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Robert A. Doughty : The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-39 (Stackpole Military History Series) before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-39 (Stackpole Military History Series):

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Excellent discussion of the entirely rational (but flawed) thinking of the French generals after World War I. By Bayard B. Excellent discussion of the thinking of the French military during the 1920s and 1930s and why it turned out to be so flawed. If only the leaders of the German army had thought like the leaders of the French army, World War II would have been so different! The discussion points out that based on the assumptions and logic of the French generals, their conclusions and actions were quite reasonable. The problem was that they simply couldn't think of alternatives to the way World War I was fought in 1918. The French generals concluded that the key to success was an overpowering methodical battle such as the Battle of the Aisne. The German generals concluded that the key to success was to avoid methodical battles at all costs because Germany didn't have the resources to win such a war. Another issue was that several French generals from 1918 were still serving in the 1930s -- not a good recipe for adopting new ideas or different thinking.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. This is a good book with lots of interesting information. It clarifies the fact that the French debacle in 1939 was not just a function of simple minded backwardness, but of actively planning for the wrong kind of war. Both the Germans and the French were trying to find a tactical solution to the deadlock that had resulted in WW1 from using outdated tactics in the face of devastating new technology. Both solutions were based upon some of the limited instances of success in WW1, and both were not in theory at least unreasonable. When they were finally put to the test, the Germans got it absolutely right and the French got it all wrong, but the reasons are much more complex than simple incompetence or ignorance. Doughty gives us a valuable insight into why. My only complaint is that it is too long and a bit repetitive and rambling at parts. I think he was trying to be thorough, but the book would have been better with some aggressive editing.

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Sympathetic criticism. By Phikee I had expected a lot of this book and it did not disappoint. The main reason is that it is well balanced- we all know the result and it is therefore easy to criticise the decisions that lead up to it. Doughty however shows how the decisions were part of a logical and analytical process that many if not most would have fallen into. The real lesson of this book is then to contemplate how to be self critical prior to the event. On every level this is worth the time and money invested as long as you are willing to reflect over your own situation and the seeds of your own disaster

An examination of the military doctrine that animated the French defense against the German invasion in 1940. Argues that the French learned the wrong lessons from World War I and were ill prepared for World War II. Lessons for modern armies about how to learn from past wars and prepare for future wars. Winner of the Paul Birdsall Prize of the American Historical Association

About the Author Brig. Gen. Robert A. Doughty, USA (Ret.), is a graduate of West Point, former chair of its history department, and a prize-winning military historian. He is the author of *Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War*. He lives in Louisiana.