


(Download ebook) How Great Generals Win

## How Great Generals Win

*Bevin Alexander*

*ePub / \*DOC / audiobook / ebooks / Download PDF*



DOWNLOAD



+

READ ONLINE

#708359 in Books Bevin Alexander 2002-06-17 2002-06-17Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 8.30 x .80 x 5.50l, .81 #File Name: 0393323161320 pagesHow Great Generals Win | File size: 73.Mb

**Bevin Alexander : How Great Generals Win** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised How Great Generals Win:

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Fantastic Book!!!By Edward AndersonCan't say enough about this book or any of the other books this author has written!!! If anyone wants to study tactics and strategies to WIN a war or in Life, THIS is the book to get. I know, because I have read all of the other books (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, etc. etc.)and none hold a candle to this one!!!1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Great Analysis of Winning

StrategiesBy Nick HowesA look at the factors that led great military leaders throughout history to succeed. As Sun Tzu recommended, many used misdirection. Stonewall Jackson excelled at misdirection to tie down the Union Army in the Shenandoah Valley during the approach to Vicksburg early in the war, which even McClellan might've pursued if he had the troops guarding the valley. Scipio Africanus attacked Hannibal in Italy by crossing the Mediterranean to strike at Carthage itself. Guderian struck through the Ardennes after Germans attacked as expected through Belgium and France, achieving such success it even made Hitler nervous. MacArthur went against all the common wisdom and invaded Korea at Inchon, slashing through the overextended North Korean supply lines to cut off their frontline troops at the Pusan Perimeter. Napoleon in his early years specialized in another approach: maneuvering around to attack at the rear. Sherman followed another strategy in advancing from Atlanta, sending out several columns, each threatening more than one city, then struck unexpectedly at an undefended target. These and other strategies and how they have been used by military leaders from Genghis Khan to Mao to Rommel to Allenby are examined in this very interesting book and summarized in a helpful final chapter.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful. How to Win WarsBy Eric GartmanGreat generals win by attacking the enemy's flank or rear, thereby distracting and dislocating the enemy from his supplies, communications, and undermining his confidence. Direct attacks merely consolidate an enemy's defenses and even if he is defeated merely forces him back on his reserves and supplies. That in a nutshell, is the argument presented by Bevin Alexander in his study of ten great generals, ranging from the ancient world to the modern day. Yet most military leaders have not followed these precepts. According to Alexander, these methods require imagination and cunning, whereas society views deception suspiciously (Although Edward Luttwak suggests that the reason is that indirect methods require more supplies and effort). Using this analysis, Alexander not only shows us how great generals win, he also shows us that some generals thought of as great were in fact mediocre or poor. For example, Alexander claims that Sherman, not Grant won the Civil War. Grant used direct methods to attack Lee in 1864 and in one month lost 55,000 men, twice as many as Lee. With the meat of his army gone, his forces bogged down in front of Petersburg for nine months. Meanwhile, Sherman used speed and deception to win the war. In his campaign against Atlanta, he refused to launch frontal assaults on enemy entrenchments. Instead he went around their defense and continued to march on Atlanta. This forced the enemy to attack him on his terms, and he inflicted great losses on them. He then cut the rail lines to the city. Atlanta was abandoned and Sherman marched across Georgia and the Carolinas, sapping the Southern will to fight. "The purpose of war is to diminish the possibility of resistance," not necessarily to destroy the enemy's army through battle. Speed and mobility are the keys to this strategy. And the ten generals written about here used these techniques to win wars and change the course of history. Alexander would later build on the lessons he wrote about in this book and write his magnum opus, "How Wars are Won," an even better study of military techniques.

"An astute military historian's appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of war." Kirkus Reviews If a key to military victory is to "get there first with the most," the true test of the great general is to decide where "there" is—the enemy's Achilles heel. Here is a narrative account of decisive engagements that succeeded by brilliant strategy more than by direct force. The reader accompanies those who fought, from Roman legionaries and Mongol horsemen to Napoleonic soldiery, American Civil War Rebels and Yankees, World War I Tommies, Lawrence of Arabia's bedouins, Chinese revolutionaries, British Desert Rats, Rommel's Afrika Korps, and Douglas MacArthur's Inchon invaders. However varied their weapons, the soldiers of all these eras followed a commander who faced the same obstacles and demonstrated the strategic and tactical genius essential for victory. "All warfare is based on deception," wrote Sun Tzu in *The Art of War* in 400 BCE. Bevin Alexander shows how great generals have interpreted this advice, and why it still holds true today. Maps, illustrations

From Publishers WeeklyAlexander ( *Korea: The First War We Lost* ) reveals how some of the great military men of history applied common-sense principles of warfare that "nearly always will secure victory." Relying on deception, these generals usually won their campaigns with a surprise attack on the enemy's rear or flank. Leaving aside the killed-and-wounded advantage of such maneuvers, Alexander emphasizes the decisive psychological effect on enemy soldiers and their commanders. Generals whose deceptive, indirect, surprise tactics are considered here include Scipio Africanus ("The General Who Beat Hannibal"), Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Stonewall Jackson, William Tecumseh Sherman ("The General Who Won the Civil War"), Mao Zedong, Erwin Rommel and Douglas MacArthur. Alexander makes the interesting point that these principles are for the most part self-evident, yet most generals ignore them in favor of the direct frontal assault. He is surprisingly critical of the Confederacy's icon, Robert E. Lee, for his tendency to resort to direct (and costly) methods such as Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. He calls MacArthur "a military Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, capable of both brilliant strategic insight and desolating error." This study is essential reading for students of military strategy and tactics. Copyright 1993 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Kirkus sAn astute military historian's mildly contrarian appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of war. Arguing that von Clausewitz's thoughts about the bloody solution of battle have been misread over the years, Alexander (*Lost Victories*, 1992, etc.) asserts that the principal purpose of armed conflict is to reduce the possibility of

an enemy's resistance (a view the author shares with Sun Tzu). Alexander then ranges back and forth through time to identify and comment upon commanders who were able, in the words of Stonewall Jackson, to "mystify, mislead, and surprise" their foes. Among those who measure up are Scipio Africanus (who bested Hannibal); Napoleon (who, in 1797, conquered northern Italy through innovative techniques); Sherman (whose march to the sea broke the South's will during the Civil War); Subedai (whose Mongol hordes sacked Buda and Pest during the mid-13th century), and MacArthur (whose daring Inchon assault turned the tide of the Korean War). Covered as well are the bold WW I campaigns mounted by Allenby and Lawrence in the Middle East; Mao's defeat of the Kuomintang; and the nervy genius of three top generals whose misfortune it was to serve Nazi Germany--Guderian, Rommel, and von Manstein. A merciless critic of annihilative, brute-force engagements (of the sort he witnessed as a US Army officer in Korea), Alexander makes a persuasive case for great captains who achieve their strategic ends via maneuver, stealth, guile, or a willingness to defy conventional wisdom. The author's analysis suggests that the doctrines that guide professional soldiers (be they Roman legionnaires or Norman Schwarzkopfs) have remained notably constant for more than two millennia. Informed opinions on the martial arts that draw provocative distinctions between victors and winners. (Maps--not seen) -- Copyright ©1993, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. "This study is essential reading for students of military strategy and tactics." --Publishers Weekly "An astute military historian's mildly contrarian appraisal of what separates the sheep from the wolves in the great game of war . . . Informed opinions on the martial arts that draw provocative distinctions between victors and winners." --Kirkus s