


[DOWNLOAD] Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea

Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea

Leon V. Sigal

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Leon V. Sigal : Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea:

11 of 19 people found the following review helpful. North Korea is not CanadaBy minainseoul@hotmail.com There are some good aspects of this book analysing the ins and outs (mostly outs) of United States policy toward North Korea and its nuclear program. But the book has one enormous drawback: it treats everything that the United States and its allies did with suspicion, while giving North Korea every benefit of the doubt. I did not understand the

expression "blame America first" until I read this book. There is nothing in this book about North Korean terrorism or attacks on the South Korean Blue House. Mr. Sigal treats North Korea as if it were Canada. It is not. His good points would come through better if he was not so one-sided.⁸ of 12 people found the following review helpful. Track 2 and Cooperation are good for nuclear strangersBy A CustomerBias on the part of American policy-makers affected U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward North Korea. If the U.S. would not have maintained such a bias, negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea would not have been as difficult. That is the author's main point, but what he overlooks is not an analysis of why U.S. policy-makers, from the beginning of Korean War and beyond, maintained a bias, This drawback notwithstanding, the book contains many interviews and documents, and is, therefore, a historically important study.

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

From Library JournalThe story deftly told in this weighty but engaging book may seem unfamiliar, says the author, because "key parts...never appeared in the news." Sigal (*Fighting to a Finish*, LJ 6/15/88) drew up the New York Times editorials about Korea under Presidents Bush and Clinton and accordingly thought he knew what had happened. Nevertheless, he discovered the inside story only when he visited major players and reviewed key documents (many reproduced here) for this book. Realpolitik policies of unilateral coercion failed, argues Sigal, partly because of South Korea's intransigence and U.S. intelligence snafus. Negotiations led by Jimmy Carter, however, went from the brink of war in 1994 to "open covenants, privately arrived at." Sigal offers disturbing and enlightening insights into the reasons why news coverage left this critical story untold, how "cooperating with strangers" replaced coercion in "getting to yes," and the significance of this liberal challenge to "realism" in dealing with nuclear crisis. Recommended for all public affairs and international relations collections. ?Charles Hayford, Univ. of Illinois at ChicagoCopyright 1997 Reed Business Information, Inc. Winner of the 1998 Book of Distinction on the Practice of Diplomacy, The American Academy of Diplomacy"Sigal makes it disturbingly clear how close the world came to war in Korea in 1994. The product of hundreds of interviews, *Disarming Strangers* is also the most rigorously detailed account of U.S. policy towards North Korea yet published, and it will remain so for many years.... An important and superbly researched book."--Michael J. Mazarr, *Survival* "This is a thought-provoking and disturbing book on American and North Korean diplomatic relations. *Disarming Strangers* is also an extremely well-researched study."--Bill Drucker, *Korean Quarterly* From the Back Cover "Leon Sigal's *Disarming Strangers* is the most comprehensive treatment of the U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations available.... Sigal is at his best in describing the way governments actually come to make decisions."--Robert L. Gallucci, U.S. Negotiator at the High Level Talks, 1993-1994 "A brilliant reconstruction of how close we came to war with North Korea in 1994, . . . A highly cautionary tale, illustrating the value of cooperation, not confrontation, in dealing with dangerous strangers having nuclear aspirations."--Donald P. Gregg, former Ambassador to South Korea "Anyone who cares about how American foreign policy should be conducted after the Cold War should read this book."--Morton H. Halperin, former member, National Security Council Staff