


(Download free pdf) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Science 101 (Collins))

# Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Science 101 (Collins))

*David Galula*

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**David Galula : Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Science 101 (Collins))** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Science 101 (Collins)):

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Jim DeFronzo - The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences;

Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements By Jim DeFronzo - *Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements; The Iraq War*

French Colonel David Galula wrote *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, originally published in 1964, while at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. Many of Galula's guidelines about counterinsurgency were developed from observations of the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Greek Civil War, the Malayan insurgency, the Vietnamese Revolution, and the Algerian Revolution. While Galula provides intelligent analyses, he at times makes statements that seem contradictory such as suggesting (2006, 9) that the insurgent attracts support through what he says he is going to do, rather than through what he actually does. But this is not consistent with what Galula states is the insurgent's, as well as the counterinsurgent's, goal of attracting and holding onto popular support. Mao Zedong, identified by Galula as a major authoritative source on revolutionary warfare, emphasized that it is crucially important for the insurgent to gain popular support by what he does, not just says, by acting in ways that are viewed as beneficial by the majority of the people. Another indication of Galula's fallibility was his underestimation of the favorability of conditions for the Viet Cong in South Vietnam (2006, 71). Galula points out that insurgents and counterinsurgents compete in the context of asymmetrical warfare. The initially weak insurgent force uses methods suited to its limited capabilities. The counterinsurgents, according to Galula, should use tactics that take maximum advantage of counterinsurgent strength. Although the insurgents, for example, are often highly mobile and can choose when and where to attack, the population supporting the insurgents is generally stationary and much more vulnerable. Galula claims that it is usually more effective for the counterinsurgent force to concentrate on the population, rather than focus primarily on physically eliminating the insurgents. Galula (2006, 49-60) defined victory not only as the elimination of insurgent armed forces and their organizational infrastructure, but also the isolation of insurgents from the population through the efforts of the population itself. He argues that one commander must have total control of counterinsurgent actions. Galula also says that counterinsurgent forces must constantly adapt to changing circumstances and even consider using coercive measures such as withholding jobs or food until the population in a targeted area cooperates with counterinsurgent efforts (Galula 2006, 71-72). He also asserts that the insurgent force must be denied any safe areas to regroup or organize. Counterinsurgent forces must also be aware of any divisive characteristics of the population, economic, ethnic or religious, that could be used to the benefit of either insurgent or counterinsurgent forces. Many of Galula's ideas are reflected in Petraeus and Amos's (2006) *Counterinsurgency Field Manual for the U.S. Army and Marines* and were applied in Iraq as described in Chapter 9 of *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (2010).

0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Essential reading for modern soldiers

By Peter Monks

In "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice", David Galula draws upon his professional experience (largely his time as a Company Commander and Battalion S3/XO in Algeria, as recounted in *Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958* to define a theory of counterinsurgency. Written in a similar timeframe, and shaped by almost identical experiences, to *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era), Galula's work has many similarities but in my view does a better overall job of both outlining a theory of counterinsurgency and offering a coherent and viable methodology of countering it. With an intellectual start point that "an insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims", Galula clinically describes the key features and strengths of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces and proposes clear principles for counterinsurgents. He does offer some intellectual challenges for conventionally-focused soldiers (see Galula in *Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory* (Praeger Security International) for an interesting examination of just how successful Galula's own operations were) but avoids some of the more dramatic and controversial prescriptions advocated by Trinquier. Although clear, straightforward and persuasive, this book isn't just full of good news - of particular importance is the observation that "the counterinsurgent is tied to his responsibilities and his past ... a counterinsurgent can seldom cover bad or nonexistent policy with propaganda" (read as "Information Operations" or perhaps even "Twitter and Facebook posts" for the modern day). Perhaps even more important is the observation that, given the disparity of resources required by a counterinsurgent to exercise its responsibilities for security and governance compared to an insurgent, "intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential". This is sobering and unwelcome news to Western political and military leaders looking for quick, inexpensive solutions through "shock and awe" or UAV strikes against insurgent leadership. While Galula was a product of his time and focused on the insurgent/counterinsurgent dynamic of the Cold War, in my view many of his principles have far wider applicability across a range of peace support and stabilization operations as well. Every serious soldier should be at least familiar with his arguments - in many respects, I would consider this as a useful companion to the far more recent *The Utility of Force* as a means to understanding modern military and security issues.

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. Sound, practical and hard-earned advice

By T. Graczewski

"The best writing on counterinsurgency share with the best sex manuals the fact that their authors generally have some personal experience of their subject matter." So writes John Nagl in the foreword to this classic 1964 irregular warfare piece by the French military officer David Galula. Needless to say, Galula was "experienced" - and so, too, now are Nagl and his fellow officers in the US and NATO militaries. Counterinsurgency (COIN) is all the rage these days. The apparent success of the Surge in Iraq has elevated COIN operations - often associated with the unpalatable practice (from the American military perspective) of "nation building" - from the

necessary but regrettable to the necessary and winnable. In the process it has pushed once obscure, scholarly military officers, such as Nagl, David Kilcullen, and Kalev Sepp, into the limelight and, in a certain sense, into the driver's seat of US national security policy. One tangible piece of evidence that the US military is taking COIN more seriously was the 2007 publication - to much fanfare and critical acclaim - of the US Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The concepts the Galula developed first-hand from tours in French Indo-China and Algeria and which he so cleanly and directly lays out in "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" form the foundation of the new Field Manual. Indeed, it is shocking just how broadly and deeply Galula's perspective permeates US military doctrine half-a-century after it was first written. Galula has much to say that carries with it lasting relevance. There is much to commend in this book; however, I will highlight just two central points in this review. First, Galula addresses the question: what makes for a successful insurgency? He argues that four factors are critical. First, the insurgency needs a great cause - one that has broad appeal and cannot be easily co-opted by the government. A notable example would be rural land reform in Vietnam and the Philippines. This cause serves as the main narrative from which the insurgents can sustain and build a powerful political operation. Second, the initial strength of the insurgency is inversely related to the strength of the government forces. An unpopular regime with a weak and/or corrupt local police force is especially susceptible. Third, the physical geography of the region is important. As Galula states, "the ideal situation for the insurgent would be a large land-locked country shaped like a blunt-tipped star, with jungle covered mountains along the borders and scattered swamps and plains, in a temperate zone with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy." (About 80% of that description applies to Afghanistan, unfortunately.) And, finally, outside support is important, especially in the middle and later stages of the insurgency. Next, once an insurgency has taken root, what is the most practical course to defeat it? Galula emphasizes the political nature of the contest. "What is at stake is the country's political regime, and to defend it is a political affair... Thus, a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen." Moreover, Galula stresses the political, military, and economic dimensions of the COIN operation must be tightly integrated and mutually reinforcing. He argues that these separate efforts are multiplicative in nature and not additive. That is, in a multi-variable multiplication set, if any input is zero then the final answer is always zero regardless of the other inputs (e.g.  $80 \times 0 \times 50 \times 20 = 0$ ). Galula then lays out an explicit step-by-step approach to conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign. It's a bit formulaic and is tinged by the Cold War perspective in which it was conceived, but the basic premise and cadence is sound.

1. Expel the insurgents from a defined geographic area. This will likely result in civilian deaths and property damage, which the government should move quickly and aggressively to make reparations.
2. Deploy a static permanent presence unit. This force is meant to hold the cleared area and develop a rapport with the local population.
3. Contact and control the population. Re-establish government authority in the area by isolating the population from the insurgents by conducting a thorough local census and establishing check points in and out of the region. In the meantime, be relentless with intelligence collection and propaganda efforts to address attentisme, where the neutral majority simply waits out the conflict or hedges their bets.
4. Destroy the insurgent political organization. This is a police operation, first and foremost. Galula suggests a wide catch of minor players and the subsequent rolling up of local insurgent cells based on their disclosures. He also says that the government forces should use amnesty offers prudently at this stage.
5. Hold local elections. This is the critical point in getting the local population to step-out and commit the counterinsurgency forces. Galula argues that the openness and freedom of elections needs to be stressed, but that the resulting government is only provisional. He also says that it is a bad sign if only older men are elected as it is likely the younger men who are supporting the insurgency.
6. Test the local leaders. Elections are not enough. Those elected must be given real responsibility and held accountable for their performance. It is essential that the new local government representatives demonstrate their commitment and competence, both to the counterinsurgency forces and, more importantly, the local population that elected them.
7. Organize a political party. Parties are the instrument of politics and counterinsurgency is a political battle. The importance of developing this political organization and platform cannot be overemphasized, Galula says. Only a strong, local political apparatus will make victory and progress permanent.
8. Suppress the last guerillas. As the counterinsurgency force takes root, Galula calls for reverting to the first stage of large-scale military operations to keep the remaining insurgents on the run and away from the population. The goal is to turn the last hold-outs into a roving band of criminals. It is at this point that more generous amnesty offers can be granted, he writes. A lot has been written on counterinsurgency and a river of ink will certainly be consumed in future efforts on the subject, but there is still no better place to begin (or end) than with this tightly crafted, thoughtful classic.

This volume in the Praeger Security International (PSI) series Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era defines the laws of insurgency and outlines the strategy and tactics to combat such threats. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of

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The best "how-to" guide to counterinsurgency warfare. --Bernard Fall, Author of Street Without Joy, 1967  
About the Author: David Galula was a French Army officer who graduated from St. Cyr Military Academy in 1939. A veteran of the North African Campaign and the liberation of Italy and France during World War II, he later went on to serve in China, Greece, Indo-China, and Algeria. He wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare as an International Fellow at Harvard University. Lieutenant Colonel Galula died in 1967.